We present new empirical evidence on the relationship between voting technology and election outcomes. First, using data on nine elections in the Netherlands, we distinguish between the introductory and the more permanent effects of electronic voting. Second, we distinguish between national and municipal elections, which have different incentives to fraud given the Dutch system of proportional representation. Third, we test for a possible asymmetry between the effect of moving from paper ballots to electronic voting, and the effect of reverting to paper ballots. Fourth, we control for the density of polling stations. This is crucial as the introduction of voting machines usually goes along with a reduction in the number of polling stations. Using two different data sources -municipality-level data on actual voting behavior and a panel survey among eligible voters -we find small positive effects of electronic voting on voter turnout, a substantial negative effect on the fraction of residual votes, and no effect on the share of left wing parties.
Introduction
After having served democracies for decades, the paper ballot is being replaced by technologically more advanced ways of casting a vote in many countries.
But the trend toward voting by touching a screen, pushing a button, or clicking a mouse is not uncontroversial. Problems regarding electronic voting have been reported for Belgium, Brasil, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, and other countries; see New York Times (2007) for a recent example. While vulnerability to fraud is a central concern, electronic voting has also been criticized for not sufficiently protecting the legal right to cast a vote confidentially. Shortly before the Dutch parliamentary elections in November 2006, it was found that votes cast with voting machines of a specific make could be traced from a distance with specialized equipment. As a response, a number of municipalities, including Amsterdam, decided to revert to paper ballots for casting votes.
These events stress the need for insight into the possible effects of voting technologies on election outcomes. The most notable paper that measures these potential impacts is Card and Moretti (2007) (CM from hereon) , who analyze the effects of touch-screen voting using data on the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections. CM conclude that this has had a negative effect on voter turnout, and a small but statistically significant positive effect on electoral support for George Bush.
Because the effect was not larger in swing states, or in states with a Republican Secretary of State, the authors conclude that it was probably not the result of irregularities or fraud.
The present paper supplements previous work in a number of ways.
First, by considering a sequence of nine different Dutch elections during the period 1994-2006, we can distinguish between the impact of the introduction of electronic voting and its more permanent impact. Since the introduction of electronic voting usually goes along with informational campaigns and extra media attention, these two effects are likely to be different. Second, we distinguish between national and municipal elections. The distinction is of interest since in a system of proportional representation (as is the case in the Netherlands) incentives to fraud are larger in municipal elections than in elections for the national Parliament. Thus, if we would find that the effect of electronic voting is larger in municipal elections than in national elections, this might be interpreted as an indication of irregularities. Third, while previous empirical results exclusively relied on one-time changes from paper ballots to electronic voting, our data also includes a number of reverse changes as a result of the November 2006 events. This additional variation helps to address earlier criticism that a significant effect of electronic voting technology might merely pickup county (or municipality) specific trends. Fourth, as voting machines are expensive, their introduction usually goes along with a reduction in the number of polling stations.
Since this increases individuals' average distance to a polling station -and hence costs of voting -the polling station density is crucial to control for in establishing the causal impact of electronic voting on elections outcomes, in particular voter turnout.
Using two different data sources -municipality-level data on actual voting behavior and a panel survey among eligible voters -we estimate the effects of voting technology on voter turnout, the share of left wing parties, and the share of residual votes. We find a small positive effect of electronic voting on voter turnout, in particular when used for the first time, and a strong negative effect on the share of residual votes. We do not find an effect on the share of left wing parties, neither in municipal, nor in national elections.
Voting technology in the Netherlands and data
In the Netherlands, municipalities are responsible for organizing both the municipal and national elections, and decide on what voting technology to use. In the past two decades, virtually all municipalities replaced paper ballots by electronic voting machines. There are two competing firms that provide the electronic voting machines, with one of them (Nedap) having by far the largest market share. Election dates are uniform in all municipalities, with the exception of local elections in merged municipalities, which we exclude from our study. Other election regulations are uniform across the country.
We collected data on voting technology by contacting all individual municipalities. For some municipalities we failed to establish exactly when electronic voting equipment was introduced, as local officials find it more difficult to provide this information the farther this moment lies back in history. We therefore decided to focus on the municipal council elections in 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 , and the national elections (for parliament) in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2006 
Empirical analysis
An important issue in our analysis is what predicts the use of electronic voting. 4 Table 2 investigates how electronic voting is related to time varying municipality characteristics, year dummies, and previous elections outcomes. In municipal as well as national elections the year dummies are large and significant, and dominate the explanation of electronic voting. Moreover, as shown in the second and fourth column, the use of electronic voting is unrelated to the outcomes of the previous election. In sum, table 2 strongly suggests that the introduction of electronic voting has been a largely autonomous process. Note that virtually all municipalities introduced electronic voting, but at different points in time.
Using the municipality data on actual voting behavior, we estimate separate linear probability models for three types of election outcomes: voter turnout, the share of left wing parties, and the share of residual (including blank) votes.
We use three types of explanatory variables. First, we control for variables describing the voting technology that was used (dummies for electronic voting, for first-time electronic voting, and for reversal to paper ballots). 
Results
Electronic voting has a small positive effect on voter turnout in municipal elections, but no significant effect in national elections; see table 3. In municipal elections, about two thirds of the effect is permanent. The introductory effect in national elections is significant, but this is based on only a very small number of first-time electronic voting cases  most municipalities that introduced electronic voting did so at a municipal election; cf. However, errors on behalf of the voter leading to a residual vote are virtually impossible.
We find that electronic voting indeed lowers the proportion of residual votes; see table 5. In municipal elections the effect is particularly strong and fully related to electronic voting itself, not its introduction. The inclusion of turnout does not affect the voting equipment coefficients in a significant way.
Our data allow to test for a possible asymmetry between the effect of moving from paper ballots to electronic voting and the effect of a reverse change (as in 24 municipalities just prior to the 2006 national election). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are symmetric.
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The analysis based on the survey among eligible voters leads to similar conclusions. In all models (linear probability models and logit models with individual specific fixed effects, for having voted and for having voted left wing) we found some significant effects for variables related to voting costs (in particular a strong positive effect of the option to vote at the polling station of own choice on the voting probability), but no significant effects for the voting technology variables.
Conclusion
We find that electronic voting has a small positive effect on voter turnout, in particular when used for the first time. While there is a large negative impact on the number of residual votes, we do not find an effect on the share of left wing parties, 6 We included a dummy for the reverse change, and tested whether its coefficient is the negative of the coefficient on electronic voting. In all cases p-values exceeded 0.1. The power of the test is limited, given the small number of reverse changes in the data. However, while the fraction of municipalities that reverted to paper ballots is 3 percent, the change applied to 9 percent of the voters.
neither in municipal, nor in national elections. Our results therefore do not provide indications of voting irregularities related to voting equipment. Also, we do not find any evidence of an asymmetry between the effects of introducing and abandoning electronic voting. Omission of the number of polling stations (which typically decreases upon the introduction of electronic voting) biases the coefficient on electronic voting downwards. This may help to explain the discrepancy between our results and those reported by CM with regard to the effect on voter turnout. 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2006 elections; municipal elections: 288 municipalities; 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 elections. Fixed-effect panel weighted least squares estimation, using the number of eligible voters in 1998 as weights. Clustered tvalues in parentheses. All estimations include municipality fixed effects. .
